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Social democracy and the problem of equality: economic analysis and political 
argument in the United Kingdom. 
The revival of widespread concern with inequality was a striking feature of early 
twenty-first century public and academic debate.  For example, the G20 meeting of 
Ministers from the world’s biggest economies in September 2015 was presented with 
a joint paper from the ILO, IMF, OECD and World Bank following the previous 
G20’s commitment to reduce ‘inequality and poverty’, arguing that inequality had 
slowed growth and was having a ‘corrosive effects on social and political cohesion’ 
(ILO/IMF/OECD/World Bank, 2015).  Christine LaGarde, Managing Director of the 
IMF, repeatedly made speeches stressing the damage done to stability and growth by 
rising inequality (World Economic Forum, 2017).1 This has been accompanied by an 
explosion of work by economists on the issue (Piketty (2014), Stiglitz, 2012). 
In terms of both dominant political arguments and economic analysis these events 
mark a sharp reversal, certainly in the developed capitalist countries. In much of that 
world the last decades of the twentieth century were notable for both a political 
downplaying of equality as a goal, and often indeed an emphasis on the positive 
benefits of inequality.2 In economics, while there was no single position on the issue, 
the oft-cited words of Robert Lucas in 2004 were typical of much mainstream 
thinking, even if expressed in unusually forthright terms.  ‘Of the tendencies that are 
harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most 
poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.’ (He continues: …of the vast 
increase in the well-being of hundreds of millions of people that has occurred in the 
200-year course of the industrial revolution to date, virtually none of it can be 
attributed to the direct redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The potential for 
improving the lives of poor people by finding different ways of distributing current 
production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing 
production.’ (Lucas, 2004).  
Such views have not been disappeared amongst either economists or politicians, but 
have become less evident in the years since the financial crash. Whilst amongst 
economists there has been a notable upsurge in the focus on inequality, as noted 
above, there remain those who think this is mistaken (for example, Mankiw, 2013; 
McCloskey 2014). 
This paper analyses this shift by looking at the intertwining of economic analysis and 
political argument in one country, the United Kingdom. In the UK the international 
shift towards an emphasis in reducing inequality has been mirrored in the ideological 
stance of the Labour Party, evident in the 2017 general election manifesto (Labour 
Party, 2017). This manifesto, while saying nothing directly on the overall issue of 
income inequality, reflected the egalitarian rhetoric of its title by aiming to reverse the 
last forty years of policy by proposing a ‘fair taxation system’ with a new marginal 
                                                 
1 World Economic Forum, 2017. 
2  This view was not limited to the advocates of ‘trickle down’ policies in the era of 
Reagan and Thatcher, but embraced important economic analysts in countries such as 
Sweden, for example, Lindbeck (1994). 
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income tax rate of 45% starting at £80,000 a year, and 50% from £123,000 (along 
with increases in corporation tax).   
This manifesto was produced against the background of a conscious repudiation of the 
legacy of the previous, ‘New Labour’ government of 1997-2010, and the belief that 
re-focussing on equality was to return to the central concern of social democracy. It is 
worth noting that this political shift cannot be explained as simply mirroring the ‘facts 
on the ground’ about what is happening to inequality. While there is evidence of 
increased inequality in recent years in most countries, (as discussed further below) the 
big increase in inequality in the UK (measured by the Gini-Coefficient) was in the 
1980s, and at that time this evoked much less of a broad political concern with 
inequality.  
In the light of this new departure this paper focusses on the work of Tony Atkinson, 
the most important British economic theorist and policy advocate on this issue since 
the 1970s.3  It examines his work in the context of the evolution of British social 
democratic thinking about inequality (see also Tomlinson 2016).  
The first section looks at how far Atkinson’s work in the 1970s re-shaped the social 
democratic debate. The second part looks at his responses to Thatcherism and the 
remarkable rise in inequality in the 1980s.  The third looks briefly at the New Labour 
period after 1997, and the final section deals with the ‘Left turn’ in the post-Crash 
period and how far Atkinson’s work has helped shape new approaches.     
     I 
Many British social democrats have long sought to define their politics by attachment 
to the pursuit of equality (Crosland (1956); Jenkins (1952); Le Grand (1982). The 
political and ideological history of this egalitarianism has been given serious attention 
(Ellison (1994); Jackson (2007); Francis (1997).  There is also significant work on 
social democratic tax policy (Whiting, (2000); Daunton (2002). Much less attention 
has been paid to the relationship between this thinking and economics.4 
Most accounts of British social democracy and the question of inequality start with 
the canonical work of Richard Tawney (Tawney (1931/1964); Tomlinson (2002); 
Winch (2000).  In his text of 1931 Tawney offered a powerful distinctive case for 
greater equality, and then suggested that there was widespread agreement that 
measures to reduce inequality were of three types:  ‘those, in the first place such as 
the extension of social services and progressive taxation…by securing that wealth 
which would otherwise have been spent by a minority is applied to purposes of 
common advantage…those , in the second place, such as trade unions and industrial 
legislation, which…soften inequalities of economic power…those, in the third place, 
like the development of undertakings carried on as public services, or the co-operative 
movement, which…transfer the direction of economic policy from the hands of 
capitalists and their agents to those of an authority responsible to society’. He saw 
                                                 
3 Atkinson died in January 2017. The importance of his contribution can readily be 
understood from the range of commemorative contributions in Aaberge, et al (2017). 




these measures as together constituting a ‘strategy of equality’, though he argued that 
we were not likely to get far with first two unless the third was achieved (Tawney 
(1931/1964): 119, 120).  
 
Two features of his work are striking. First, Tawney was strongly opposed to 
quantitative notions of equality. As one of his biographers suggests: ‘Tawney did not 
have an arithmetical but an algebraic notion of equality’ (Terrill 1973: 122). His key 
claim was that distribution should follow service rendered, so it was in principle 
possible for quite large income disparities to be justified on this basis. As a result of 
this view, Tawney’s use of data is sparse and unreflective. On both wealth and income 
he draws on conventional academic sources, and their standard way of quantifying 
inequality, to provide data of the form ‘64 per cent of the wealth was in 1920-21 in 
the hands of 1.6 per cent of the persons’ and ‘in1910, just over 1 per cent of the 
population took 30 per cent…of the national income’ (Tawney 1931/1964: 68,72). 
 
Second, Tawney was extremely hostile to the emerging discipline of economics, a 
hostility in part grounded on a caricature of the alleged utilitarian groundings of that 
discipline, and this hostility helped to bifurcate discussion, and meant that early 
discussions of inequality and its measurement by social democratic economists,  
notably Hugh Dalton, were entirely distinct from Tawney’s work.5 Tawney’s hostility 
was common (though not universal) amongst early social democrats, despite the fact 
that contemporary economists were both interested in socialism as a general issue, 
and at the same time developing tools that social democrats would eventually find 
useful in talking about inequality (Tribe, 2016:41-45).  
 
Atkinson pays tribute to Tawney’s arguments, and it may be argued that their work 
embodies a similar egalitarian commitment (Atkinson, 2015:  9, 25, 271-2.) But he 
was clear that however inspirational, ‘Tawney himself would surely have been the 
first to recognise that his conception and statement of the problem were very much 
products of his times. The case for equality has to be made in terms of current 
concerns and circumstances’ (Atkinson, 1983: 23). Despite such sympathies, 
Atkinson’s work was strikingly different, both in its profound engagement with 
economic theory, and its concern with quantification. Indeed, one reason for the 
importance of Atkinson’s first substantial intervention in the British policy debate in 
1969 was that it marked a moving away from the dominance of the field shaped by 
Tawney’s hostility to economics (Atkinson, 1969).  
 
Prior to this book, most of the major works of post-war egalitarian social democrats 
were not by economists, or, in the case of Crosland, by an economist who had no 
professional expertise in the field. Key figures include Crosland (1956); Titmuss 
(1962); Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965). 
 
Although he was soon to publish a foundational theoretical article on the topic 
(Atkinson, 1970), Atkinson’s 1969 book is not directly concerned with the question of 
inequality, but rather aims ‘to examine the available evidence about poverty in Britain 
today, and to evaluate the various proposals that have been made for reforming the 
social security system’. Thus the book places itself within two existing strands of 
                                                 
5 On the importance of Dalton’s work see Atkinson and Brandolini (2015). Dalton 
was Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer 1945-47. 
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analysis: the strong tradition of British poverty studies, going back to Booth and 
Rowntree, and the peculiarly British social security system built, in large degree, on 
the work of Beveridge (Booth, (1901); Rowntree (1901); Beveridge (1942). From this 
starting point Atkinson concentrates on the position of two categories of persons—the 
elderly, and the male full-time worker. 
 
The situation of the elderly and the reform of pensions has been central to the British 
welfare state since the 1940s, given an ageing population and the dominance of the 
social security budget by pension payments.  But the question of the income of low-
paid workers raised the most complex and in the long-run even more important 
problems. The basic Beveridge position was that poverty largely arose from 
‘interruption of earnings’ and large family size. The assumption was that those in 
work would therefore not be poor unless they had a large number of children, which 
Beveridge argued should be dealt with by family allowances (Atkinson, (1969): 21-
22). 
 
This approach was the foundational for the post-war British social security system and 
its basis in social insurance. Yet in the 1960s evidence was accumulating that a 
significant proportion of those in poverty were in work, even where they had small 
families. (Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965). Atkinson addressed two main ways of 
responding to this problem, by increased child benefits, or a national minimum wage. 
Atkinson does not strongly urge such a wage, and his approach to its impact is rather 
narrow one concentrating on its employment effects and impact on different 
categories of low-paid worker. Broader in scope is the discussion of Negative Income 
Tax and Social Dividend schemes, precursors in important respects of today’s Basic 
Income ideas. 6 Again, Atkinson is careful in his judgement and sceptical about some 
aspects of these kind of schemes. He compares them with a ‘Back to Beveridge’ 
approach and sees neither as unambiguously superior. But the context in which such 
schemes were to work was to shift hugely over the next fifty years, as discussed 
further below. 
 
At the end of Poverty and the Reform of Social Security Atkinson calls for the 
establishing of a Royal Commission on Poverty to ‘help draw to the problem of 
poverty the attention which it undoubtedly deserves’ (Atkinson, 1969: 194-195). No 
such Royal Commission was ever set up, but in the 1970s the Labour government 
established a Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth. This 
partly reflected the immediate political circumstances of the mid-1970s, especially the 
Labour government’s desire to conciliate trade union opinion in the face of major 
confrontations about wages, but is also reflected a significant shift away from 
focussing on poverty to looking at the whole income distribution. Atkinson played an 
important part in this shift with his book on the wealth distribution, a highly under-
researched field at the time (Atkinson 1972).  
 
As with lots of Atkinson’s more applied writing, a feature of the book was the breadth 
of policy issues it addressed, including social ownership and various devices for 
spreading wealth. But as is also the case elsewhere in his work, the main focus was on 
                                                 
6 Sloman (2016). Note that the social dividend was associated, amongst others, with 
the work of another egalitarian economist, James Meade, who Atkinson says first 
encouraged him to work on such issues: Atkinson (1969): 11. 
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what might be thought of as the staple of the social democratic egalitarian agenda –
taxation. And here Atkinson seems to be going with the grain of debate on the left in 
Britain in the 1970s, which saw a series of publications on the egalitarian or otherwise 
effects of the tax system (Kincaid 1973; Field, Meacher and Pond 1977). 
 
In understanding this focus of the 1970s, it is useful to link it to the longer-term 
trajectory of social democratic thinking. After 1945 what came to be called revisionist 
social democracy, exemplified by Crosland’s (1956) book, made two claims that were 
not easily reconciled. On the one hand they asserted the absolute centrality of equality 
to social democracy, partly because of a desire to build a sharp distinction with other 
strands of left-wing doctrine that emphasized public ownership as the defining 
feature. On the other hand, a major hurdle on the route to increasing equality was 
asserted to be that the limits of income tax had been reached. Crosland stressed the 
extent to which across the war period incomes had been equalized, and property 
incomes especially squeezed, leading to the conclusion that the tax system couldn’t 
take any more income away from capitalists, so egalitarians should now focus on 
wealth redistribution and widening educational opportunity (Crosland, 1956).   
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, partly through the failure to index thresholds, income tax for 
the first time became a tax paid by the bulk of the working class. Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE), which had been invented in wartime to allow the taxation of lower incomes, 
was a great engine of tax gathering and allowed income tax to reach its peak of 
significance in the overall tax take. But this success in revenue raising brought new 
dilemmas to social democratic policy, as the question of redistribution via taxation 
became much sharper amongst its traditional constituency (Whiting (2000): 173-258). 
By the 1970s many social democrats had effectively conceded Crosland’s claim about 
the limits of (income) taxation being reached. 
 
Atkinson’s work on tax focussed on fundamental issues about how to reconcile 
optimal taxation with egalitarian objectives. (Stiglitz (2017): 429-30).  But his work in 
this area was on a high theoretical level, and he played relatively little role in the tax 
debates of the 1970s. He dropped out of the key committee chaired by Meade on the 
tax system, and did not focus much attention on specific tax reforms (IFS/Meade 
1978). 
 
Despite the focus on taxation in the political and policy debates of the 1970s, the 
impact of economic thinking on the social democratic debate was limited. The Meade 
report proposed a fundamental shift towards a progressive expenditure tax, alongside 
social security reform and a wealth tax. But its approach did not prioritise egalitarian 
goals, despite Meade’s own strong egalitarian commitment. 
 
In 1983 Atkinson questioned the commitment of the contemporary Labour party to 
equality. ’Whatever the achievements of recent Labour governments, no one could 
claim that the elimination of inequality has been a dominant theme. In this respect 
perhaps more than any other, the labour movement appears to have lost its sense of 
direction’ (1983:22) He argued that this commitment needed to be founded not just on 
a desire to eliminate relative poverty, but a broader egalitarian desire, expressed by 
Tawney, to allow everyone a full sense of participation in the community (1983:28) In 
addition, Labour needed greater clarity on how it aimed to deliver greater equality. 
Two elements of this part of the discussion stand out. First was a  sharp dividing line 
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drawn between the approach of Liberals and Labour on whether the focus should 
solely be on redistribution via taxes and social spending, favoured by the former, or 
also embrace the market distribution prior to any government role: ‘A Labour 
government should act to secure a distribution of wages and profits which, taken 
together with the tax and benefit system, will ensure its distributional objectives.’ 
(1983:32).  
 
Alongside the lamentation at the loss of progressivity in the tax system, is the 
commitment to social insurance as ‘an essential element in realising Labour’s 
commitment to equality’. This was grounded in a very strong hostility to the means 
testing of benefits which had been recently extended, but was ‘incompatible with 
dignity and self-respect’ (1983: 34,35.)  So in this very summary statement of his 
position in the early 1980s, it is clear that Atkinson continued to prioritise a ‘back to 
Beveridge’ approach rather than the more radical changes he had previously discussed 
such as negative income tax. 
II 
Under the Thatcher government in the 1980s Britain experienced its  biggest ever 
shift to greater economic inequality. The Gini co-efficient rose from 0.23 in 1978 to 
0.34 by 1992 (Sefton et al 2009: 3).  Atkinson responded very strongly to this 
reversal, and argued at length about the economists arguments which he saw as linked 
to this shift, whilst also diagnosing its causes. 
In his The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State Atkinson 
deployed many of the arguments and techniques from the burgeoning field of public 
economics (a field of which he was one of the key founders) to criticise those 
economists who had attacked the extension of state welfare. 7 Notable amongst these 
are Lindbeck, Dreze and Malinvaud, and Feldstein, all of whom alleged that, by 
different mechanisms, the growth of social security (and the taxes to fund it) had 
slowed down the rate of economic growth. As in most of his writing Atkinson is 
notably dispassionate in his approach to the work of these theorists, seeking to clarify 
arguments and deploy close economic reasoning to assess their arguments. He 
focusses particular attention on the issues highlighted by Feldstein, of pensions and 
unemployment pay. On pensions, he shows how the claim that state provision of 
pensions reduces household savings and thereby investment rests on a macro model of 
dubious plausibility. His discussion of unemployment pay focusses on institutional as 
well as analytic issues, especially in showing how claims that unemployment pay 
increased unemployment relied on making inaccurate claims about the exact 
conditions surrounding such payments (Atkinson, 1999). 
Particularly because of the importance of social security policy to his egalitarianism, 
Atkinson was very much concerned with explaining the underpinnings of government 
decisions on such policy, and for him this meant taking seriously the claims of public 
choice theory (see also Atkinson 1993) He notes how limited the critical (empirical as 
well as theoretical) response to that approach had been, a claim which is still true 
today. Most literature on the ‘rise of neo-liberalism’ plays inadequate regard to the 
                                                 
7 Atkinson (1999); Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) is a foundational text in the field. 
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way in which public choice ideas have helped undermine belief in state action, a key 
accompaniment to the ‘market fundamentalism’ which has proliferated. 
Key causes of the sharp rise in inequality in the 1980s were the combination of higher 
unemployment and increasing earnings dispersal (Atkinson, 1995a). One very 
important issue raised here is whether the sectoral shift towards deindustrialization 
could account for any part of that increase. Atkinson cites evidence to the contrary, 
focussing instead on issues such as skills and trade unions. (1995a 27-8). The same 
question is raised in his Presidential address to the Royal Economic Society, where he 
raises the possibility of an analysis which mirrors that of Kuznets in his famous 
exposition of the Kuznets’ curve. (Atkinson, 1997). Kuznets argued that the fall in 
inequality as a result of industrialization resulted from the fact that while the 
dispersion of incomes was more equal in agriculture than in industry, the dominant 
force in the move to greater equality was the fact that within the growing industrial 
sector the trend was an egalitarian one. (Kuznets, 1955). But Atkinson wants to focus 
away from this kind of structural argument, to attend more directly to the personal 
distribution of income. 
This is linked to his view that the economist’s traditional focus on the factoral 
distribution has not usually been followed through into explaining the personal 
distribution of income. Hence he starts from the latter, with attention on the household 
sources of income. In particular, he emphasized the role of social security in personal 
distribution. Using data for Britain in 1993 he stresses that the share of income from 
work (whilst declining) was predominant (73 per cent), that from social security was 
second most important (14 per cent), with income from capital coming third (11 per 
cent) (1997: 304-305). 
Atkinson’s response to the leap in inequality in the 1980s made clear the important 
role of the social security policies of the Thatcher government in that shift. In 
particular, he analysed the cumulative way in which benefits for the unemployed had 
been slashed (Atkinson and Micklewright 1989). But while the importance of this 
attack on the incomes of some of the poorest should not be downplayed, there was a 
paradox that despite the widespread talk of ‘rolling back’ the welfare state, no such 
overall roll back took place. Atkinson recognises this, citing Le Grand’s summary 
‘welfare policy successfully weathered… an ideological blizzard in the 1980s.’   
(Atkinson (1999): 23; also Daunton (2002): 338.)     
In this way Atkinson suggested one the great paradoxes of the 1980s, when  
inequality greatly increased, but despite strong governmental ambitions the welfare 
state was not seriously ‘rolled back’ (Tomlinson, 2019). One of the reasons for this 
failure of roll-back was the straightforward rise in eligibility for benefits due to higher 
unemployment.  While the level of unemployment pay fell, the number of claimants 
rose. At the same time, as the labour market slackened, many of the unemployed 
moved on to the more generous sickness and disability pay (Piachaud, 1986).  
But what was also beginning to emerge in the 1980s was high levels of expenditure 
on wage subsidies. While Atkinson was prescient in discussing the possible impact of 
de-industrialization on inequality, he, like everyone else, did not see how that process 





The Thatcherite attack on redistributive taxation effectively boxed in social 
democratic thinking, so that by the 1990s there was an ideological ceiling on direct 
tax rates. Under New Labour, which eventually brought in enormous rises in public 
spending, these had to be financed largely out of economic growth or from ‘stealth’ 
taxes, as ideologically Labour did not have the Conservative favourite option of 
raising VAT, seen as a regressive tax. Ideologically also, the very fact that direct tax 
increases were ruled out made it more difficult to talk about redistribution, so closely 
had these two issues become entangled in public debate. Whiting emphasizes that 
‘Redistributive social spending does not require progressive taxation to fund it; 
indeed, for much of the period, a tax system that was only mildly progressive overall 
supported cash benefits which were slanted more heavily to the poor’ (2000: 2). This 
important point, made at the end of the twentieth century, would be even truer today, 
with the tax system roughly proportional over most of the income distribution. A large 
part of the explanation for this pattern of tax incidence is the sharply declining share 
of income tax in central government revenues, a halving from its peak of 56% in the 
mid-1970s down to today (1974-1997 data in Jackson and Saunders 2012: Appendix 
2). 
 
The New Labour government of 1997-2010 made little direct use of the tax system to 
achieve distributional goals. But it did redistribute income significantly towards the 
bottom end. Much of this was done by policies that were means tested (pensioner 
guarantees; tax credits for working families and children). ‘The reduction in child and 
pensioner poverty since 1997 is a significant achievement, especially when set in 
historical context’ (Sefton et al 2009: 28).  These strategies sit uneasily with 
traditional social democratic thinking, especially the rapid growth of wage subsidies, 
a system which challenges the underpinnings of much of the post-war social welfare 
consensus (Tomlinson (2016a).  
 
After the unprecedented rise in inequality since the late 1970s, income inequality by 
many standard measures remained stable under New Labour.  However, if we focus 
on the top 1 per cent, then we find their share of total income increased from around 6 
to nearly 9 per cent (1997-2010)—an almost fifty per cent rise, up from around 3 per 
cent in 1975 (Bellfield et al 2016: 24-5).  
 
New Labour made no direct promises to reduce inequality, but it did promise major 
reductions in poverty, especially amongst children and pensioners. As poverty was to 
be defined in relative terms (relative to median incomes) success in this policy would 
undoubtedly reduce inequality across some part of the income distribution.  The 
evidence suggests this poverty reduction strategy was to a considerable extent 
successful. So the legacy of New Labour is a complex one for those aiming at a more 
direct ideological and practical assault on inequality.  
 
     IV 
 
A UK social democratic party committed to egalitarian objectives, such as the Labour 
party under its current leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, is the legatee of a complex 




From the time of Tawney most social democrats have put social spending at the centre 
of their egalitarian programmes. So it is important to ask ‘who benefits?’ from welfare 
state spending. John Hills (2015) has stressed that most, perhaps 80 per cent, of social 
security spending is about smoothing life time patterns of income, and only 20 per 
cent involves vertical redistribution. This is a very important correction to ideologies 
which conjure up the notion that ‘welfare’ is all about redistributing from a tax-paying 
majority to an ‘underclass’ of recipients. Similarly, we should try and be clear about 
the distribution of benefits from the non-cash parts of the welfare state, which with 
the growth of health, education and social care have formed an expanding share of 
total ‘welfare state’ expenditure. Most British social democrats have argued that an 
effective ‘social minimum’ can only be built on universalist principles, because 
provision designed only for the poor, would inevitably become poor provision. This 
has been a highly successful aspect of social democratic politics. Universal health 
care and state-funded education, whatever the structural and managerial changes 
introduced in their provision, have remained politically unassailable. But this success 
has had paradoxical consequences for egalitarian politics.  
 
On the one hand, it has boosted support for universal provision beyond social 
democracy’s political supporters, but on the other, it has meant relatively little focus 
on the distributional impact of various types of social spending. Questioning of the 
effectiveness of social spending in achieving egalitarian goals has usually come from 
the Right, while on the centre-left the discussion has been muted. An exceptional 
contribution from an egalitarian is the work of Le Grand (1982), whose approach 
plainly contradicts Tawney’s emphasis on the collective aspect of social services, in 
favour of what can be characterised as the orthodox but egalitarian economist’s 
Utopia of a redistribution which expands consumer sovereignty by increasing cash 
incomes, eliminating the ‘distorting’ effects of state provision.   
 
Le Grand’s distributional analysis has been paralleled in British official statistics, 
where from the late 1950s the government published annual assessments of the effects 
of taxes and benefits on household incomes’. The most recent analysis provides this 
striking summary: ‘The poorest fifth of households received benefits in kind 
equivalent to 62.8 per cent of disposable income, with the NHS (35.4%) and 
education (25.4%) being the largest contributors. The richest fifth of households. On 
the other hand, received benefits-in-kind equivalent to 8.4% or disposable income, 
again NHS (6.0) and education (2.0) the largest contributors’ (ONS 2018: 10). 
 
The general pattern of social democratic neglect of these services and their 
distributional effects is evident in the work of Atkinson, despite his involvement in 
the debate about measuring the output of such services in the national accounts 
(Atkinson 2008).  Atkinson’s last book (2015) book is replete with data—almost fifty 
figures and tables. The most surprising absence from measurement, or indeed serious 
discussion, is the significance of the social services for equality (with the partial 
exception of education). While a chart acting as a ‘guide to household income’ notes 
the need to include the ‘value of public services’ to get a full view of household 
income, none of the distributional charts use the extended conception, but focus on 
after tax income (Atkinson 2015: 269). There is only one footnote (out of almost 450) 





This is a very striking omission, not only because of its centrality to Tawney’s 
‘classic’ treatment, but because of the role spending on such services has played in 
debates in British social democracy. Atkinson’s book proposes a very wide- ranging 
agenda of egalitarian reform, but within the discussion of the role of the public sector, 
the focus is on tax and social security, not social spending on benefits in-kind (see 
also Atkinson 1997) The only discussion around decisions in the public sector 
concerns questions about the virtues of seeing employment levels as crucial to 
maintain quality in these services. 
 
We can regard discussion of the distributional impact of in-kind services as something 
of a blind-spot in recent discussions of inequality. It is perhaps particularly amongst 
economist that this is the case, so that recent work has been more in  public policy 
rather than economics journals (for example, Paulus et al 2010). 
 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the ‘headline’ egalitarian policy of 
contemporary social democracy in Britain is increasing taxes on higher income 
groups. This is part of a very long-standing notion in British social and political 
thought that taxation could be used as a means to re-shape society (Daunton 2001: 
332).  In thinking about the economics and politics of this focus, it is useful to start 
with the quantitative representation of inequality.  
 
From the beginnings of social democracy a form of percentile/decile tabulation has 
been by far the most common form of representation of income inequality. Such 
representation has an obvious, intuitive appeal, especially when (as is usually the 
case) emphasis is put on the large share going to the top. The appeal of this in 
comparison with the Gini Co-efficient, its main academic rival, is obvious.  For 
example, to be told that this Co-efficient for the UK went from 0.23 in 1978 to 0.34 in 
1992 can only seem dramatic to the initiated. It is not a statistic that political 
campaigns can ground themselves upon.  
 
Atkinson, along with others such as Piketty, has been a major figure in recent analysis 
which has emphasized the share of the top percentiles (Atkinson, 2005; Atkinson, 
Piketty, Saez, 2011). Atkinson argues that this focus has partly been driven by the 
disparity (especially in the USA) between growth of incomes at the top and stagnation 
at the median. He defends this focus with the important claim that a policy concern 
with what is happening to the incomes of the rich correlates strongly with addressing 
problems of distribution lower down. From a sample of OECD countries, he argues 
that ‘Only Switzerland appears to have below-median poverty while having above 
median top income shares. Higher poverty tends to go along with larger top shares.’ 
(Atkinson, 2015: 25). 
 
Bringing top incomes into our understanding of the distributional pattern, where they 
had previously been obscured, is important. But the problems of focusing on the top 
percentiles are also significant.  First, it detracts attention from where much of the 
redistributive impact of policy is concentrated. Most traditional social democratic 
efforts and successes have concerned redistributions from those above median 
incomes to those below, rather than from those at the very top. The reduction in 
poverty evident in post-war Britain required a shift in resources which went far 
beyond the top one per cent, via a mildly progressive tax system and a much more 




The focus upon the top percentile in readily lends itself to political positioning; hence 
the ‘we are the 99 per cent’ slogan. (See O’Connor’s discussion in this special edition 
of the politics of focussing upon ‘the 1 per cent’ in the USA).  More fundamentally, 
the focus on a small proportion of the rich and wealthy at the top seems to fit with 
developments in popular but problematic understandings of the class hierarchy in 
recent decades. These understandings are characterised, crudely, by a perception of a 
‘great big middle’ of ‘ordinary’ people, covering most of those who in traditional 
sociological categories would have been both working and middle-class, with a small 
‘rough’ class below, and a small elite above. The political appeal (and, of course, 
deliberate shaping) of this perception is attested by the ubiquity of the appeal to 
‘ordinary working families’ in British politics since the 1970s (Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
2018: 145-202). 
 
So focussing upon one decile or percentile necessarily simplifies the picture, and the 
danger is that the ‘othering’ of the top proportion may lead to misperceptions about 
the social categories that may be the target of redistributive policies. For example, 
Labour’s 2017 manifesto emphasizes that the only tax rises will be for the top 5%. 8  
In the UK a household consisting of two full Professors (with no dependent children) 
would fall easily within this band. 9  This example emphasizes that, given the small 
number but enormous size of the ‘giants’ at the top end of the distribution, we need to 
think very carefully about how we visualize the scope as well as the scale of any 
intended redistribution—with, of course, implications for the instruments that might 
be used to effect such a change. 
 
Analysis of top incomes shows that the most rapid growth has not been amongst the 
top 10%, or even the top1%, but amongst the top 0.1 per cent. While the share of the 
top 1% has been increasing since the mid -1970s, the really remarkable growth has 
been amongst the top 0.1%-so today perhaps one-third of the top 1% share goes to the 
top 0.1. Also, at the very top end of the distribution, more income has fallen outside 
the PAYE system, as forms of income have diversified.  The rich are no longer “idle”, 
and earn salaries, but much of their income comes from additions, share options etc., 
and these are forms of income that are much more ‘malleable’ for tax purposes. 10 
Such problems mean that the capacity of those who pay an increased share of income 
tax (because their incomes are so high, and because thresholds have been raised) to 
avoid this tax has increased. PAYE as a mechanism of effective collection has also 
been undermined by the rapid rise in self-employment, which takes large numbers out 
of the system (Blanchflower 2000). 
 
There is another problem in seeing the income tax as the major engine of 
redistribution. It is not that income tax is not progressive in itself; it has become more 
so with recent rises in thresholds, and some recent use of rates above the 40% level. 
                                                 
8 Labour Party (2017: 9). Possible confusion arises because only 4% of income tax 
payers and 2% per cent of the adult population have incomes above Labour’s 
proposed threshold for higher income tax of £80,000; IFS (2017). 
9 Calculated on the basis of data from https://www.ifs.org.uk/wheredoyoufitin/  
10 Between 1949 and 2000 the contribution of investment income to the income of the 
top 1 per cent fell from 41 to 13 per cent: Atkinson (2015): 107. 
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But. As noted above, its contribution to total taxation has fallen markedly, halving to 
under 30 per cent in the last forty years.  
 
Within arguments about income tax, there has been a wholly unhelpful focus on rates. 
A striking example of a much broader phenomenon is the way in which the enhanced 
devolution settlement in Scotland grants the Edinburgh government control only of 
these rates, and no control over the definition of income (allowances, etc). Yet many 
of the key distributional features of the UK income tax (and most such systems) are 
driven by what counts as taxable income. Particularly egregious are the enormous 
(and regressive) reliefs given to pension contributions, where most of the benefit goes 
to the higher rate (40%) payer. 
 
In his last book Atkinson provided a strong defence of high (65 per cent) income tax 
rate, against the trend amongst economists, especially following the work of Mirrlees, 
to claim that ‘optimal’ rates for high earners were significantly lower than this figure.  
But it is notable that Atkinson’s arguments here are largely empirical, and he does not 
offer the kind of fundamental critique of ‘optimal taxation’ made elsewhere. (Offer 
and Soderberg, 2016:170-173).11 But in the current context what is important to stress 
is that Atkinson, while defending high income tax rates, has also suggested some of 
their limits as a mechanism of redistribution. 
 
Following the inspiration of James Meade, Atkinson had a persistent concern with 
radical changes to the tax system towards embracing a ‘social dividend’ or what has 
generally become known as a Basic Income system (Atkinson 1995: x).  His initial 
discussion goes back to 1969, and is even-handed but sceptical, whilst in the 1990s he 
was more even more sceptical because of the costs (Atkinson, 1969: 157-184; 
Atkinson 1993: 30-31). But like many others he became more favourable to the idea 
in recent years, with an endorsement of the idea of a ‘participation income’(a basic 
income subject to the condition of some social contribution) in his last book, though 
he did not see it as a panacea, and his schema would be only a partial replacement for 
other social security payments (Atkinson 2015: 218-223). 
 
This shift in approach partly reflects a recognition of the forces driving the growth in 
income inequality, particularly growing wage dispersal. As noted above, Atkinson’s 
analysis of the causes of rising inequality in the 1980s suggested that de-
industrialization was not a key factor because of rising dispersion in all sectors. But 
over the last twenty-five years the evidence of the scale of polarization in the service 
sector has shifted the argument decisively towards recognising this sectoral shift as a 
major cause of inequality and a major problem for egalitarian politics (Goos and 
Manning 2007).  
 
The recognition of the changing nature of the economy, and the significance of these 
changes for egalitarianism, is reflected in Atkinson’s last book, which puts forward a 
very wide range of policy possibilities, well beyond the traditional social democratic 
staples of income tax and social security, that his own previous work had focussed 
upon. Arguably the most important of these is the ‘re-opening’ of the entwined issues 
of capital ownership and corporate governance (2015: 155-78). Here there is a case 
for social democrats to look for useful elements of analysis in the neglected work of a 
                                                 
11 His critique is somewhat more wide-ranging in Atkinson (2012). 
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previous generation of social democratic economists, especially James Meade, 
(Atkinson 1993; Meade 1964) whose work fed so significantly into that of Atkinson. 
Current revived discussion of these matters would be strengthened by recognising the 
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